Limits to product differentiation and stable market positions / 973 by Kumar, K. Ravi


FACULTY WORKING
PAPER NO. 973
Limits to Product Differentiation and
Stable Market Positions
K. Ravi Kumar
College of Commerce and Business Administration
Bureau of Economic and Business Research
University of Illinois. Urbana-Champaign

BEBR
FACULTY WORKING PAPER NO. 973
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
August 1983
Limits to Product Differentiation
and Stable Market Positions
K. Ravi Kumar, Assistant Professor
Department of Business Administration

Abstract
This paper deals with the concept of product differentiation and
natural limits that can be placed on it arising from consumer search.
Using a model of monopolistic competition, with consumers basing their
buying decisions on known industry average price, quality and service
parameters, it is shown that a Nash equilibrium, stable under pertur-
bations, cannot have more than four strategies. To specify these
possible strategies, a general model of consumer preference regarding
price, quality and service is posited and explicit stable strategies
are illustrated. This analysis will be particularly useful to modern
market-positioning thinking—firms developing a new product for a par-
ticular target market can perform a similar analysis to get a clear
idea of possible positions available and also those that are rela-
tively stable.
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Introduction
The phenomenon of product differentiation has become a way of life
in the market place. The common misconception is that such differen-
tiation occurs primarily in consumer goods. The same is also true of
industrial goods, such as oil and steel, and services, such as legal
and financial.
Theodore Levitt (1980) argues that there is no such thing as a com-
modity, which is a term used by economists in describing a product
that is supposedly generic. He claims that all goods and services are
dif ferentiable—even if the generic product is identical, the offered
product is differentiated. Even though the above argument does not
explain why the product should be differentiated, but rather that it
can be, it does imply that differences in consumers and/or producers
mav necessitate differentiating the product. An example of this
forced differentiation is given by Kumar (1981) who looks at a single-
good market model of monopolistic competition with identical pro-
ducers. In his example, the nature of the demand function neces-
sitates the formation of two district strategy groups in an economic
equilibrium. Since there is only one good, it is necessarily dif-
ferentiated by each group.
The question remains whether there is any limit to the extent to
which a product can be differentiated. The implication in Levitt (1980)
is that, potentially, there is none; "only the budget and the imagina-
tion limit the possibilities." On the other hand, one detects a move
to an oligopolistic form of markets for most stable products, like
automobiles, steel, toothpaste, etc. It is a rule of thumb to expect
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three or four firms to control "most" of the market in many
industries. This suggests that there might very well be limits to
product differentiation.
In this paper I look at this question analytically, using the
modeling technique used by Kumar (1981). I consider an industry in
which consumers make their buying decisions based on aggregate sta-
tistics of industry strategies, i.e., consumers know the average
price, average quality and service level in the industry and make
their purchasing decision based on this information and some search
procedure. Using the concept of Nash equilibrium, i.e., no firm has
the incentive to change their strategy given the competitors' strate-
gies, and the idea of structural stability, i.e., stability under small
perturbations of the model, I show that the maximum number of groups
(or strategies), that these firms can split into, is precisely four,
when the number of aggregate statistics is three. The conclusion is
that, given the assumption that consumers make their decisions based
on a fixed number of aggregate statistics, there is definitely a limit
on the extent of product differentiation.
I pursue the idea further to find out what types of market posi-
tioning are possible with respect to the price, quality and service
characteristics. To do this, I impose a preference structure, which
is quite general, a measurement scale on characteristics, which is
specified in classes relative to the industry averages, and use the con-
cept of efficient frontiers (or current technology) sets. With this
structure, T show that stable frontiers have exactly four distinct
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strategies in them and there are exactly 12 such frontiers possible.
I explicitly enumerate them and discuss their features.
This analysis is particularly useful to modern market-positioning
thinking—firms developing a product for a particular target market
have a clear idea of the possible positions available and also those
that are relatively stable.
I present the economic model of the market in Section 2 and prove
the stability result concerning maximal differentiation in Section 3.
Section 4 deals with market positioning results and I present the
concluding remarks and future research efforts in Section 5.
Section 2
The Model
My model of monopolistic competition consists of n firms, each of
which produce a single product for the market. Each firm's product can
be differentiated, but it remains a close substitute for the products
of the other firms. I will assume that the consumers of this product
group base their buying decisions on the distribution of strategies of
all firms. It is usual, in the literature on consumer search, to
assume that this distribution is explicitly known. I deviate here by
contending that consumers know only a few statistics of this distribu-
tion. For instance, it is more common for the consumers to know the
average price than the entire price distribution itself. More speci-
fically, I will assume that the statistics used in the buying deci-
sion are average price (P), average quality (0) and average price
service level (S).
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From the producer's point of view, each firm's demand function,
and hence, its profit function, is dependent not only on its own
available strategies but also the triplet (P, Q, S). I will assume
that firm i's available strategic variables are its price (P.),
quality (Q . ) and service level (S ). Then, let
7f(P
i , Qi , siS 7, Q,
Is)
be the payoff function common to all the firms, as required by the
assumption of identical firms. It is clearly symmetric in its argu-
ments and it will be assumed that it is continuously differentiable in
all its variable but not necessarily quasi-concave in its strategic
variables (P., Q. , S.). As is usual, I will assume that the firms are111 *
profit maximizers over their strategic variables (P., Q. , S.) while111
taking the aggregate statistics (P, Q, S) as given.
The appropriate equilibrium concept in this model is the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium and I will be looking at the symmetric
equilibrium since, a priori, all firms are identical. By my conven-
tion, the equilibrium exhibits product differentiation if it is in
mixed strategies and the number of strategies in this mixed
equilibrium is the extent of product differentiation. For instance,
if there is only one strategy in the equilibrium, then there is no
product differentiation since all firms are behaving alike; if there
are three strategies in the mixed equilibrium, then the firms split
into three groups displaying distinct strategies and necessarily dif-
ferentiated products. I will assume that there are a finite number of
strategies in the mixed equilibrium.
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Def ; A symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium with a finite sup-
port of dimension k is given by ((P., Q . , S
.
, w.)._,, (P, Q, S))
satisfying
2 u)
i
ir(P
i , Qt , Si , P, Q, S) > Z w±Tt&±9 Qi , S^ P, Q, S)
,
i=l i=l
(oefl, (P
i , Q± , S.) e R(P, Q, S)
and Z u.P. = P, S w.Q. = Q, £ u> S = Sli l i i
i=l i=l x i=l
for all ooeft
where R(P, Q, S) is the set of (P., Q , S.) which globally maximize
profits at (P, Q, S) and ft is the set of all discrete probability
measures with support of dimension k.
The above definition implies that there are k strategies
(P., Q., S.)._ 1 which are the best response strategies given (P, Q, S)
and that each of these strategies has a corresponding probability
u). associated with it. This probability (w.)._, is the one that gives
the highest expected profits compared to all other probability
measures and also satisfies the consistency condition that the
expected or average value of the best response strategy (P.
, Q . , S .
)
is indeed OP, ~Q, ~S )
.
It is quite easy to show that if ((P., Q., S , <0. ,, (P, Q, S))
is a symmetric mixed equilibrium, then the profit level associated
with each response, that has a positive probability associated with
it, must be the same (Owen 1968). We will assume that all the best
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responses have a positive probability associated with them, i.e., the
equilibrium is regular.
We are now ready to discuss the issue of how large k, the extent
of product differentiation, can be.
Section 3
Limits to Product Differentiation
A priori, one has no reason to believe that there is a bound on
the extent of product differentiation for the model presented. I am
going to impose the condition of stability in the equilibrium struc-
ture and with this restriction, a definite limit on product differen-
tiation emerges.
The concept of stability of a mixed strategy equilibrium used here
is similar to that of structural stability in differential topology
(Guillemin and Pollack 1974). The fundamental building block in my
model is the profit function and in practice, one can estimate it to
within some non-zero margin of error. Given these small perturbations
in the profit function, one can ask the question whether the
equilibrium in these perturbed models is similar and close to that in
the unperturbed model. If so, the equilibrium in the unperturbed model
is said to be stable.
Let us consider a mixed equilibrium with support of dimension k
^ •* 'ie 4e 1
((P.,, Q., S., u>.). ., ("p*, "q* ~S*)) for the model characterized by the11 l i i=l
profit function *• This implies that around a small neighborhood of
(P*, Q* , S*) , there exists k local maxima and by the assumption of
regularity, they are isolated. Also, the profit levels at each of
these local maxima, at (P*, Q*, S*) , is the same, i.e.,
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let x
±
= (P
t , Qt , S t ), i=l, ..., k
and y = (P~, "q, "s)
3 k-1
and D: R + R
be the profit difference map defined by:
• D(y) = (Tr( Xi (y),y) - *((xi+1 (y) ,y)
,
x e S(y)
j=l , • • • i k
i-1, ..., k-1)
where S(y) is the set of local maxima at the point y = (P, Q, S).
Then, in a small neighborhood of y* (P*, *Q*, S*), D(y) is well
defined and D(y*) = 0.
I will consider all perturbations if. of the function it such that
the functional value of tt and the first and second derivatives of
it can be made as close as needed to those corresponding values of tt
by choosing X small enough. To ensure the stability of the
equilibrium using profit function tt, I need to show the existence of a
similar equilibrium, close by and unique in a neighborhood of the ori-
ginal equilibrium, for all perturbations tt., with X in a some open
neighborhood of the value 0. (I am assuming tt = tt). Three con-
ditions have to be satisfied for such an existence, namely
(1) the local maxima sets S(y) and S,(y) must be close to each other
in a neighborhood of y* and the cardinality of S,(y) should be
equal to k.
(2) if condition (1) is satisfied, then the profit difference function
D, is well defined in this neighborhood of y*. Then, we need to
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show the existence of y. = (P,
, Q, , S,) close to y* , in the neigh-
borhood were D, is defined such that D
x (y x )
= 0.
(3) Then we need to ensure the existence of a probability vector
co. such that the expected value of the best response strategy
it it it * * *
(P iX , QiX , SiX ) is indeed (P x , Q x , Sx ).
Condition (1) can be shown to be true through an application of
the implicit function theorem and using the fact that the local maxima
are non-degenerate critical points (Guillemin and Pollack 1974). It is
the second condition which leads us the limitation on the value that k
can take.
Instability Theorem ; If the dimension of the aggregate statistics
space (P, Q, S) is three, then no mixed equilibrium with a finite sup-
port of dimension more than four can be structurally stable.
Proof ; Note that the profit difference function
satisfies D(y*) = 0. When k > 4, the dimension of the domain space is
less than that of the range space. This implies that the range of D
k-1
is a closed set of measure zero in R . Then any small perturbation
of D will never hit the range of D almost surely, implying that there
exists for A, however small, a perturbation D, such that
D (y
x
) # for all y .
Then condition (2) is not satisfied and hence the equilibrium is
unstable. JJ
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The result implies that if there are three statistics involved
(P, Q, S) then the firms canot spliti i to more than four groups,
each group differentiating the product uniquely, in a stable
equilibrium. Notice that it does not assure us a stable equilibrium
with exactly four groups but rather that it could exist. Also, with
three aggregate statistics, we could very well have a product dif-
ferentiated stable equilibrium with only two groups of firms. Also,
one can presumably construct an example, with more than four groups in
equilibrium, in this model; but any perturbation of the example would
destroy the structure of this equilibrium.
Similar dimensional argument has been used, with inverted logic,
in the field of multi-dimensional scaling. One of the questions, that
multi-dimensional scaling can generate answers for, is: "Given a
respondent's similarity -judgements about all pairs of products in a
specific product-differentiated market, how many dimensions underlie
this respondent's judgements about the similarity-dissimilarity of the
products?" In our context, this query concerns itself with the iden-
tification of the number of aggregate statistics used in the model,
given that there are n firms or groups of firms in the industry. It
is well known (Churchill 1976, pp. 233-241) that we can plot these n
groups somewhat arbitrarily in any (n-1) statistic space but not
constraint-free in a lower dimensional space. This is similar to my
generalized theorem (Kumar 1981) which states that if there are (n-1)
statistics, then, at most, n groups can occur in a stable equilibrium.
Let me now return to the model with three statistics (P, 0, S).
In a stable equilibrium, my result states that there can be, at most,
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four groups with differentiated strategies. What are these four
possible strategies that can occur in a maximally differentiated
equilibrium? I take up this question in the next section.
Section 4
Simple Domination and Market Positioning
In the previous section, using an economic market model of monopo-
listic competition with three aggregate statistics (P, 0, S), I showed
that there can be, at most, four groups of firms with differentiated
strategies. To specify what those strategies are is beyond the scope
of the preceding analysis since an equilibrium strategy would
necessarily depend on consumer preferences and the cost structure of
the profit-maximizing firm; in other words, without the assumption of
a specific profit map !, which is functionally explicit, one cannot
delve deeper into the structure of the equilibrium.
In Kumar (1981), a specific model of linear demand in price-
advertising space is considered along with a single aggregate sta-
tistic, namely average price. The effect of advertising, in that
model, is that of own-price information, i.e., advertising a price
lower than the average industry price increases demand level and
advertising a price higher than the average industry price decreases
demand level. In this case, it was shown that the two specific stra-
tegies in equilibrium were:
(1) price below industry average and advertise at a positive
level.
(2) price above industry average and do not advertise.
-11-
The drawback of such an analysis is that the specific functional forms
of the demand and profit function are questionable.
In this section, I am going to take an intermediate course
—
place
some reasonable assumptions on consumer preferences while not comple-
tely specifying them. I will also use the concept of efficient
frontier (or current technology) sets to identify possible equilibrium
strategy sets.
The assumption on consumer tastes, and therefore demand function,
is that there is monotonic increasing preference over quality and ser-
vice level and monotonic decreasing preference over price level. This
is a fairly reasonable assumption that one can justify since it does
not impose any comparative preference structure over the three charac-
teristics. The other assumption on these characteristics is that of
measurement: each of the characteristics' level will be measured on
an ordinal scale, relative to the average industry characteristic
level. For example, measurement of a firm's pricing strategy could be
one of three classes: below average, average, above average. In
fact, I will restrict the number of classes to three for each of the
characteristics. A rationale for this assumption is that, since con-
sumers are making their purchasing decisions based on average levels,
they would tend to categorize any individual firm's strategy relative
to the averages. For example, a consumer, using search strategy,
might classify a firm as being average price, above average quality
and below average service. The restriction to three classes is for
ease of exposition and analysis.
-12-
The next assumption is that the active strategies in equilibrium
must be those on the efficient or current technology frontier.
Essentially this implies that the frontier strategies are not dominated
by others on the frontier while, at the same time, the frontier domi-
nates every other strategy not in it. Let me make these concepts more
precise.
Def : A strategy for a firm is a triplet (P, Q, S) , where the value of
Q and S is measured as one of three classes: (1) below average, (2)
average, and (3) above average. The characteristic P is measured as
one of (1) above average, (2) average, and (3) below average.
e.g., (3, 1, 3) is a strategy denoting below average price, below
average quality and above average service.
The above definition gives every firm a point to choose from a
cube, with each lattice point referring to a unique strategy. Given
the assumption on consumer preferences, the ideal strategy that con-
sumers prefer is (3, 3, 3), namely below average price, above average
quality and service level. Obviously, some of these strategies are
dominated by others and cannot coexist in an equilibrium.
Def : Strategy i, namely (P., Q , S . ) is said to be superior to stra-
tegy j, namely (P , Q , S ) if
P, < P., Q, > Q., S, > S.
with, at least, one strict inequality. In this case, strategy j is
said to be inferior to strategy i.
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Def ; Two strategies are said to be mutually compatible if neither one
is superior (or inferior).
Def : An efficient or current technology frontier F is a set of stra-
tegies ((P^ Q
x
, S^y ..., (Pk , Qk , Sk )} such that
(a) each strategy in F is mutually compatible with every other
strategy in F.
(b) all the other strategies not in F are either superior or
inferior to some strategy in F.
(c) to preserve the notion of average, each characteristic must be
represented in, at least, the above and below average levels in
the set F.
Condition (a) represents the idea that only those strategies,
which are preference-comparable as regarded by the consumer, can sur-
vive in an equilibrium. Condition (b) ensures that all the other
available strategies for the firm are dominated either in a superior
or inferior sense. Since we have assumed that the measurement of the
characteristics are relative to the industry average, the strategies
in F have to be consistent with the notion of industry average. For
example, strategy (3, 3, 3) satisfies (a) and (b) but cannot be con-
sidered as a valid frontier since this is the only choice, by the
industry, and hence is the industry average also—this implies that it
cannot be below and above the industry average!
The rationale behind the set F being a proxy for the Nash
equilibrium set is that, since the strategies in F are compatible, it
is conceivable that consumer demand is distributed amongst them in
such a way as to equalize the profits obtained by each strategy in F.
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Since Che strategic space is finite (in fact, 27 possible
strategies) and the frontier is clearly defined, the efficient fron-
tiers can be completely enumerated. This was done using the computer
and the entire list appears in the Appendix. The following result
emerges from analyzing this list:
Result 1 : There are 113 possible efficient frontier sets. Of these,
6 of them have cardinality 3, 40 of them have cardinality 4, 57 of
them have cardinality 5, 9 of them have cardinality 6 and 1 of car-
dinality 7.
The instability in Section 3 stipulates that only those with car-
dinality of, at most, 4 can exist in a stable equilibrium. Then, we
have to reconcile the above result which allows cardinalities of 5, 6
and 7 to be possible equilibria. The bridge between the two lies in
the concept of stability and its application to the model in this
section.
Result 1 lists all possible frontiers without any regard to the
stability of the set. By stability of the set, I mean the structural
stability with respect to small perturbations in either preferences,
demand function or cost structures.
I will now describe a condition which is unstable with respect to
perturbations. It will also be shown that all of the sets with car-
dinality of 3, 5, 6 and 7 have this condition and so also some of the
sets with cardinality 4. It will then be shown that the remaining
stable frontiers have cardinalities of 4, which is consistent with the
instability theorem.
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Condition FF ; Consider an efficient frontier F containing two strate-
gies (P,, Q,, S,) and (P
2 , Q2 , S2 ). Then set F is said to exhibit
condition flip-flop (FF) if any of the following holds:
(a) ?
x
= P
2 , Ql
= S
2
, S
x
= Q2 .
(b) Q1
= Q2 , Px
= S
2 ,
S
x
= P
2
.
(c) S
1
= S
2
,
P
l
= Q2 , Qx
= P
2
.
Result 2 ; Any efficient frontier which exhibits condition FF is
structurally unstable.
Proof : Condition FF imposes a symmetry amongst two or more charac-
teristics. Let us consider, without loss of generality, a set of F
containing the two strategies (m, m.. , nu) and (m, nu, m.. ) corres-
ponding to (a) in condition FF. Since these are in the efficient
frontier and are equilibrium strategies, the profits associated with
either of these strategies must be the same. Consider the pertur-
bation of the profit function which breaks the symmetry by favoring
that strategy which has higher quality characteristic. Without loss
of generality, let us assume that m. > nu. Then (m, m., nu) has
higher profits than (m, nu , m. ) and hence is superior to it. Thus,
the efficient frontier F is unstable with respect to this
perturbation. j_J
Let us consider an example of the above result. Consider
F = {(1, 1, 3), (2, 3, 2), (3, 1, 2), (3, 2, 1)} and notice that F
exhibits condition FF since (3, 1, 2) and (3, 2, 1) correspond to
situation (a). Since F is a possible equilibrium, the profits
corresponding to (3, 1, 2) and (3, 2, 1) must be the same and this
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implies that the firm is indifferent between (3, 1, 2) and (3, 2, 1).
Now consider a perturbation of the profit function which breaks this
indifference by assigning more profits to (3, 2, 1) since it is a
higher level of the quality characteristic. Then, the profit equali-
zation is broken and F becomes unstable with respect to small pertur-
bations. On the other hand, consider F = {(1, 1, 3),* (2, 3, 2),
(3, 1, 2), (3, 3, 1)}. There is no underlying symmetry, regarding the
characteristics, that can be inferred from F and hence, no small per-
turbation of the preferences over characteristics can achieve dissolu-
tion of F through incompatibility.
Results 1 and 2 lead to the main conclusion of this section:
Stable Frontier Theorem ; Given the assumptions on consumers monotonic
preferences over characteristics, the measurement of the charac-
teristics, and characterization of efficient frontier, the only stable
efficient frontiers are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
1(1. 1, 3) , (1, 2, 2) . (3, 1. 2) , (3, 3, 1)}
{(1. 1, 3)
, (1. 3, 2) . (2, 1, 2) , (3, 3, !>}
1(1. 1, 3) , di 3, 2) , (3, 2, 2) , (3, 3, !>}
1(1. 1, 3),, (2, 3, 2) , (3, 1, 2),
,
(3, 3, !>}
{(1. 2, 2) , (1, 3, 1),, (3, 1. 3),, (3, 2, 1)}
1(1. 2, 3) , (1, 3, 1),, (2, 2, D,, (3, 1, 3)}
((1. 2, 3), (1, 3, 1),, (3, 1, 3), (3, 2, 2)}
((1. 3, 1)
,
(2, 2, 3). (3, 1. 3), (3, 2, 1)}
{(1, 3, 3),, (2, 1, 2) (2, 3, 1), (3, 1, 1)}
((1, 3, 3). (2, 1, 3), (2, 2, D ) (3, 1, D]
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(11) {(1, 3, 3), (2, 1, 3), (2, 3, 2), (3, 1, 1)}
(12) ((1, 3, 3), (2, 2, 3), (2, 3, 1), (3, 1, 1)}
It should be noted that in spite of the instability theorem
allowing stable equilibria to possess four or less strategies, the
stable frontier theorem dictates exactly four strategies. The
strength of this result is due to condition (c) in the definition of
an efficient frontier and also the measurement scale of the charac-
teristic. If the strategies available to the firms were continuous In
the characteristics rather than in discrete classes and the measure-
ment independent of the industry average, then single strategy undif-
ferentiated efficient frontiers such as low price, high quality and
high service could very well be possible, subject to technological
constraints.
The stable frontier theorem has a few features worth mentioning.
Considering all the efficient frontiers, there is always one charac-
teristic which is present only in upper and lower classes (i.e., above
and below average) while the other two appear in all three classes.
Also, strategy (1, 3, 3), which is the high price, quality and service
strategy, is always accompanied by strategy (3, 1, 1), which is the
lowest price, quality and service strategy. One would expect (2, 2, 2)
or the average price, quality and service strategy to coexist with the
preceding two but is not found. This is due to the observation that
if (2, 2, 2) were an equilibrium strategy, then there exists an undif-
ferentiated single strategy equilibrium, namely (2, 2, 2).
Some other cautionary statements about the stable frontier theorem
is that there is no preferences shown across the twelve frontiers;
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therefore, one cannot foretell which equilibrium may obtain. In fact,
my own hypothesis is that one can trace a sequence of efficient fron-
tiers (defined sans condition (c)) over the life cycle of the industry
(which is the reason for denoting them also as current technology
sets). As specified in the discussion after the instability theorem,
one could very well experience a 5, 6 or 7-strategy equilibrium, but
this will not be stable given small perturbations or shocks to the
system.
Conclusion
This research is an attempt to explain the oligopolistic structure
of many stable industries, such as automobiles, steel, toothpaste,
refrigerators, etc. In this paper, I have considered a simple market
model of monopolistic competition. The structure and concepts used
are similar to a large body of literature in economics regarding prod-
uct differentiation except in the assumption that I make on available
information. I assume that consumers are not aware of the firm's
strategy distributions explicitly, but rather some aggregate sta-
tistics of these distributions. In the model posited, I use average
price, quality and service as the key distributional parameters known
to everyone.
Using structural stability concepts, the instability of any prod-
uct differentiated equilibrium with more than four strategies is pro-
ven. To further pinpoint wbat these strategies in equilibrium may be,
I postulate a preference and measurement structure on tbe monopolistic
competition model. It is then shown, using the concepts of efficient
frontiers and stability, that exactly four strategies are possible on
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an efficient frontier and the 12 such frontiers are listed in the
stable frontier theorem.
An important extension of this research is in the direction of
relaxing the number of aggregate statistics used by imposing a
restriction that a few of the characteristics are more used than the
others, e.g., price, quality and service constitute 90 percent of the
information used. A natural result, that is yet a hypothesis, is that
four strategies dominate (say, 80%) the market equilibrium, thus giving
rise to an essentially oligopolistic market structure.
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Appendix
In this appendix, the problem formulation for the efficient
frontier model is explained and also the listing of the efficient
frontiers is given. Also specified are those frontiers which exhibit
condition flip-flop (FF) and hence are not inherently stable with
respect to small perturbations of the model. Those frontiers, which
are not afflicted with this condition, are stable and all of these
have cardinality 4.
The problem formulation is as follows:
Strategy Space C = {(i,j ,k) |i=l,2,3, j=l,2,3, k=l,2,3}
Strategy = (i,j,k) = (P,Q,S)
above average
where price P = A 2, averagei! below average
and quality Q 1, below average
(or) service S \ 2, averageu above average
Enumerate F = f(i, ,1, ,k_) , .... (i ,i ,k ) Ithey form an efficient frontier}1 11 1 mm m ' '
There are 113 such efficient frontiers and these are listed in
Table 1. Of these, 12 are stable and are denoted by * and the rest
exhibit condition FF, which makes them unstable under perturbation.
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Table 1
Number Cardinality Efficient Frontier Strategies Type
1 3 113 131 322 FF
2 3 113 232 311 FF
3 3 122 313 331 FF
4 3 131 223 311 FF
5 3 133 212 331 FF
6 3 133 .221 313 FF
7 4 113 122 212 331 FF
8 4 113 122 312 331 *
9 4 113 131 222 311 FF
10 4 113 132 212 331 *
11 4 113 132 221 312 FF
12 4 113 132 231 322 FF
13 4 113 132 322 331 *
14 4 113 232 312 321 FF
15 4 113 232 312 331 *
16 4 113 232 322 331 FF
17 4 122 131 221 313 FF
18 4 122 131 313 321 *
19 4 122 213 231 311 FF
20 4 122 213 312 331 FF
21 4 122 231 313 321 FF
22 4 123 131 212 321 FF
23 4 123 131 213 322 FF
24 4 123 131 221 313 *
25 4 123 131 313 322 *
26 4 123 132 212 331 FF
27 4 123 132 221 313 FF
28 4 123 213 232 311 FF
29 4 123 232 313 321 FF
30 4 131 223 312 321 FF
31 4 131 223 313 321 *
32 4 131 223 313 322 FF
33 4 132 223 231 311 FF
34 4 132 223 312 331 FF
35 4 133 212 221 311 FF
36 4 133 212 231 311 *
37 4 133 212 231 321 FF
38 4 133 213 221 311 *
39 4 133 213 221 312 FF
40 4 133 213 231 322 FF
41 4 133 213 232 311 *
42 4 133 222 313 331 FF
43 4 133 223 231 311 *
44 4 133 223 232 311 FF
45 4 133 223 313 332 FF
46 4 133 232 323 331 FF
47 5 113 122 131 212 321 FF
-23-
Table 1 (cont'd.)
Number Cardinality Efficient Frontier Strategies Type
48 5 113 122 131 221 312
49 5 113 122 131 312 321
50 5 113 122 212 231 311
51 5 113 122 212 231 321
52 5 113 122 231 321 321
53 5 113 131 222 312 312
54 5 113 132 212 221 311
55 5 113 132 212 231 311
56 5 113 132 212 231 321
57 5 113 132 222 231 311
58 5 113 132 222 312 331
59 5 113 122 131 212 321
60 5 113 122 131 221 312
61 5 113 122 131 312 321
62 5 113 122 212 231 311
63 5 113 122 212 231 321
64 5 113 122 231 312 321
65 5 122 131 213 221 311
66 5 122 131 213 221 312
67 5 122 131 213 312 321
68 5 122 213 231 312 321
69 5 123 131 212 221 311
70 5 123 131 213 221 311
71 5 123 131 213 221 312
72 5 123 131 213 222 311
73 5 123 131 222 313 321
74 5 123 132 212 221 311
75 5 123 132 212 231 311
76 5 123 132 212 231 321
77 5 123 132 213 221 311
78 5 123 132 213 221 312
79 5 123 132 213 231 322
80 5 123 132 213 322 331
81 5 123 132 222 313 331
82 5 123 132 231 313 322
83 5 123 132 313 322 331
84 5 123 213 232 312 321
85 5 123 213 232 312 331
86 5 123 213 232 322 331
87 5 132 232 313 322 331
88 5 132 223 231 312 321
89 5 132 223 231 313 321
90 5 132 223 231 313 322
91 5 132 223 313 322 331
92 5 133 213 222 231 311
93 5 133 213 222 312 331
94 5 133 213 232 312 321
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
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95 5 133 213 232 312 331 FF
96 5 133 213 232 322 331 FF
97 5 133 222 231 313 321 FF
98 5 133 223 231 312 321 FF
99 5 133 223 231 313 321 FF
100 5 133 223 231 313 322 FF
101 5 133 223 232 312 321 FF
102 5 133 223 232 312 331 FF
103 5 133 223 232 313 321 FF
104 6 113 122 131 212 221 311 FF
105 6 113 132 222 231 312 321 FF
106 6 113 122 131 212 221 311 FF
107 6 123 131 213 222 312 321 FF
108 6 123 132 213 222 231 311 FF
109 6 123 132 213 222 312 331 FF
110 6 123 132 222 231 313 321 FF
111 6 133 213 222 231 312 321 FF
112 6 133 223 232 313 322 331 FF
113 7 123 132 213 222 231 312 321 FF



